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AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
TO SOLAR ACCESS
While interest and investment in solar energy has burgeoned in recent years, the
need to guarantee solar consumers adequate access to direct sunlight remains a nag-
gingproblem. In Prah v. Maretti, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the tradi-
tionally narrow common law view of access to sunlight and entertained a private
nuisance suit for solar obstruction. This Note supports the Prah decision and urges
other courts to apply its reasonable use analysis to solar access disputes. It con-
cludes, however, that nuisance law cannot alone satisfy the solar access imperative.
The Note, therefore, proposes an integrated approach that incorporates nuisance
law, a solar easement statute, and popular land use controls.
INTRODUCTION
IN THE FACE of diminishing natural energy resources, develop-
ment of alternative sources, such as solar energy, is of para-
mount importance.' The viability of solar energy as an alternative
resource depends, however, upon adequate access to direct sun-
light.2 The magnitude of this problem is difficult to gauge-only
three reported cases involve solar access disputes,3 and recently
1. See ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD Busi-
NESS SCHOOL 183-215 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY
FUTURE].
2. There is a plethora of legal literature on the solar access issue. See S. KRAEMER,
SOLAR LAW 78-83 (Supp. 1984) (collecting citations to solar law books and articles).
3. Sher v. Leiderman, No. P40832 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 1982) (order overruling
demurrer); Siu v. McCully-Citron Co., No. 56405 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1979) (reported in Solar
Access Right Denied by Hawaii Court, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 542 (1979)); Prah v. Maretti, 108
Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
In Sher, plaintiff has contended that a row of trees on defendant's property which shade
plaintiff's passive solar collecting system are both a public and a private nuisance. S.
KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 25, 29 (Supp. 1984). Plaintiff based the public nuisance claim
on the California Solar Shade Control Act, id. at 25, which declares that trees and shrubs
casting a shadow on a solar collector are a public nuisance, see CAL. PUB. REs. CODE
§§ 25980-25986 (West Supp. 1984). Plaintiff also has alleged that defendant's failure to
control the trees' height is a private nuisance as defined by California law. S. KRAEMER,
supra note 2, at 29 (Supp. 1984); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 1970) ("Anything which
is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free
use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property... is
a nuisance."). A trial date has been set for June 19, 1984.
Siu involved a claim by a solar energy user against the builder of a proposed highrise
apartment building. Plaintiff sought both damages and injunctive relief, alleging express
and implied easements of sunlight and negligent and reckless interference with plaintiff's
enjoyment of her property. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
because the area was zoned for highrise buildings. Solar Access Right Denied by Hawaii
Court, I SOLAR L. REP. 542, 542-43 (1979).
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enacted solar access legislation has yet to be tested in litigation.
The solar access problem still merits consideration for two rea-
sons: in many instances obstruction threatens solar access,5 and
lack of legally protected solar access may deter investment in solar
energy.
Unfortunately, the common law affords little or no protection
to a landowner's interest in access to sunlight.7 Courts have his-
torically shown great reluctance to interfere with land use on the
basis of something "so impalpable and fleeting as air and light."'
Recently, however, in Prah v. Maretti,9 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court allowed a private nuisance action for solar access obstruc-
tion.' 0 This landmark case provides an opportunity for fresh con-
sideration of a private nuisance approach to solar access" in the
context of the recent surge in solar access legislation. Comparative
4. But see Sher v. Leiderman, No. P40832 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 1982) (order over-
ruling demurrer) (claim under California public nuisance statute).
5. Miller, Legal Obstacles to Decentralized Solar Energy Technologies, I SOLAR L.
REP. 595, 600 (1979). In addition, it is impossible to determine how many disputes reach
settlement without being reported.
6. "Even a few instances of shading, if well publicized, could have a depressing effect
on the market." Id. at 601. "Without legalprotection, a rational potential solar buyer will
think twice before committing capital to an energy source that depends on a neighbor's
whims-or on the growth of his trees, or on the construction of a high-rise apartment house
where the neighbor used to live." ENERGY FUTURE, supra note I, at 195 (emphasis added).
7. See infra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
8. Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316, 323 (1875).
9. 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
10. Id. at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 190. Discussion of a public nuisance approach to solar
access is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally G. HAYES, SOLAR AccESs LAw
171-72, 175-77 (1979) (legislative implementation of public nuisance approach may be
viable if applied only to vegetation, but in the end "invites more problems than it solves");
S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 117-28 (1978) (supporting statutory public nuisance ap-
proach to control shading by vegetation because of its directness and simplicity).
1I. Many solar access commentators had analyzed the private nuisance theory before
Prah. See G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 170-77 (disadvantages of private nuisance ap-
proach outweigh advantages); S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 129-40 (1978) (proposing pri-
vate nuisance statute applicable to vegetation only); Becker, Common Law Sun Rights: An
Obstacle to Solar Heating and Cooling?, 3 J. CoNTEMP. L. 19, 26-31 (1976) (applying Re-
statement (Second) of Torts analysis to solar access); Eisenstadt, Access to Solar Energy:
The Problem and its Current Status, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 29-31 (1982) (legislature,
not judiciary, is appropriate forum for resolving solar access issues); Note, Obtaining Access
to Solar Energy: Nuisance, Water Rights, and Zoning Administration, 45 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 357, 364-67 (1979) (economic analysis of private nuisance approach to solar access)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Obtaining Access]; Comment, Obstruction oSunlight as a Pri-
vate Nuisance, 65 CAL. L. REv. 94 (1977) (past policies denying solar access no longer
applicable) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Private Nuisance]; Comment, Securing Solar
Energy Rights." Easements, Nuisance or Zoning?, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 112, 134-39 (1976)
(zoning as alternative to private nuisance actions) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Securing
Energy Rights]; Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun, 57 OR. L. REV.
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SOLAR .4 CCESS
analysis of nuisance law and prevailing legislative strategies
reveals that no single methodology can alone resolve the solar ac-
cess problem-rather, an integrated approach is mandated.
This Note first analyzes the common law view of access to sun-
light 2 as background for discussion of Prah v. Maretti.13 Next, it
supports the private nuisance approach adopted in Prah by analo-
gizing to judicial resolution of surface water disputes.' 4  Issues
raised by implementation of the nuisance approach are then ex-
amined. 5 This Note concludes that although private nuisance is a
viable approach to solar access, a comprehensive strategy is
needed. The Note proposes combining a private right of action
for nuisance with an easement statute and land use controls. 16
94, 124-26 (1978) (private nuisance inherently flexible) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Guaranteeing a Place].
A number of commentaries on the Prah decision have recently been published. See
Recent Development, Casting a Shadow On a Solar Collector-A Cause of 4ction Recog-
nized; 4n Alternative Framework Suggested- Prah v. Maretti, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 941
(1983) (proposing land use framework focusing on blameworthiness and efficiency as sub-
stitute for Restatement (Second) of Torts analysis adopted in Prah) [hereinafter cited as
Recent Development, Casting a Shadow]; Comment, Wisconsin Supreme Court Sees the
Light: Nuisance Remedy Granted for Obstruction of Solar Access, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 47
(1983) (analyzingPrah and concluding that private nuisance law may be useful supplement
to solar access legislation); Comment, A New Place Under the Sun: Prah v. Maretti and
Common Law Solar Access Remedies, 3 N. ILL. U.L. Rav. 187 (1982) (focusing on Illinois
law and concluding that sufficient precedent exists to support adopting Prah analysis);
Note, Prah v. Maretti: Deficiencies of a Nuisance Law Cause of Action for Obstruction of
SolarAccess, 78 Nw. U.L. Rav. 861 (1983) (supporting Prah court's conclusion that strict
common law view of right to sunlight is no longer justified, but urging legislative solution
to solar access problem) [hereinafter cited as Note, Nuisance Dgiciencies]; Comment, Wis-
consin Recognizes the Power of the Sun: Prah v. Maretti and the SolarAccess Act, 1983 Wis.
L. Rav. 1263 (providing economic support for Prah, concluding that nuisance law coupled
with Wisconsin solar access legislation is fair and efficient solution to problem) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Power of the Sun]; 16 J. MAR. L. REv. 435 (1983) (Prah court correct in
recognizing need for solar access protection, but legislation is preferable); 48 Mo. L. Rav.
769 (1983) (courts should follow Prah's lead because prior law unsupported and private
nuisance easily extended to solar access area); 4 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 153 (1982) (ap-
plauding Prah for its recognition of sun's value as alternative energy resource); 52 U. CIN.
L. REv. 208 (1983) (decision of Wisconsin Supreme Court justified, but problems with pri-
vate nuisance law make it unsuited to solving solar access problem); 29 WAYNE L. REv.
1449 (1983) (neither nuisance law nor solar legislation is adequate; comprehensive ap-
proach required).
12. See infra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 41-66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 68-110 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 116-65 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 169-218 and accompanying text.
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I. PR,4H v MARETTI: RECOGNITION OF A PRIVATE NUISANCE
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR OBSTRUCTION OF SOLAR
ACCESS
Beginning with the rejection of the English doctrine of "an-
cient lights,"' 7 courts in this country have consistently disallowed
claims asserting a legal right to the unobstructed flow of sunlight
across adjoining property.' 8 Courts declining to recognize a pri-
vate nuisance cause of action for obstruction of sunlight have as-
sumed that no legal right is implicated.' 9 A judgment that a
landowner's interest in access to sunlight is per se inferior to his
neighbor's interest in land development underlies this assump-
tion.20 A narrow exception has been recognized when the struc-
ture blocking the sunlight is erected solely out of spite.2' This
exception does not, however, embrace the finding of a legal right
17. The English common law recognizes prescriptive easements to light under the
doctrine of ancient lights. Under this doctrine, a landowner can acquire a negative ease-
ment by uninterrupted use of the light flowing across his neighbor's property for a period
of 27 years. The right does not include sunlight, but only embraces light for illumination
or aesthetic enjoyment. To prevail in an action for infringement of the right, the plaintiff
must show a "substantial deprivation" of light. See Becker, supra note I I, at 23; Mosko-
witz, LegalAccess to Light: The Solar Energy Imperative, 9 NAT. REsOURcEs LAW. 177,
185-88 (1976); Comment, Securing Energy Rights, supra note 11, at 116-19.
Some American courts originally adopted ancient lights. See, e.g., Clawson v. Prim-
rose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873); Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57 (1838). However, the doc-
trine has now been uniformly rejected. For a comprehensive review of the cases, see
Moskowitz, supra, at 188-89 n.60. The leading case, Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1838), sets forth three justifications for the rejection. First, and most importantly,
courts feared that ancient lights would impede land development at a time when this coun-
try was highly undeveloped. Id at 318. Second, it was thought impossible to have adverse
use of light. Id at 316-17. Third, courts were concerned that acceptance of ancient lights
might lead to erection of useless structures to cut off the prescriptive period. Id at 318.
18. Most courts in this country do not recognize implied easements to light and air
primarily due to a bias in favor of land development. See, e.g., Morrisson v. Marquardt, 24
Iowa 35 (1867); Mullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135 (1869); Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368
(1859). But see, e.g., Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365, 32 A. 939 (1895); S.A. Lynch Corp. v.
Stone, 211 Ga. 516, 87 S.E.2d 57 (1955).
The courts have, however, consistently honored express easements to light and air. See,
e.g., Bryan v. Grosse, 155 Cal. 132, 99 P. 499 (1909); Keating v. Springer, 146 Ill. 481, 34
N.E. 805 (1893); Homewood Realty Corp. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 160 Md. 457, 154 A.
58 (1931); Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890).
19. See infra notes 24 & 34-37 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 24 & 40 and accompanying text. According to the Prah court, this
judgment is based on three policy considerations: the right of a landowner to use his prop-
erty as he pleases, the minimal value of sunlight, and unimpeded land development. See
infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Private Nuisance, supra note
11, at 105-12. Per se rules of nuisance liability are often overruled as social conditions
change. See infra note 40.
21. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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to sunlight- it reflects judicial condemnation of spiteful actions.22
A. The State of the Law Before Prah v. Maretti
Historically, many courts did not recognize a nuisance action
for the erection of spite fences.23 Some held that a nuisance action
would not lie absent a legal right to sunlight.24 Others reasoned
that a landowner's motive for erecting a structure on his own
property is irrelevant; a bad motive does not render an otherwise
lawful act unlawful.25 Some courts sought further to justify denial
of a nuisance action by distinguishing light and air obstruction
from other nuisances. It was thought that a nuisance had to in-
volve physical invasion of property.26
Recognition of a nuisance action for spite fences appears to be
emerging as the dominant view.27 Courts recognizing such actions
generally utilize one of three approaches to liability. The majority
view is that liability attaches only if the fence serves no useful
purpose.28 Erecting a structure solely for spite is not considered a
22. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Giller v. West, 162 Ind. 17, 69 N.E. 548 (1904); Mahan v. Brown, 13
Wend. 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835); Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 42 N.E. 765 (1896);
Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900). A spite fence is a structure "which
is of no beneficial use or pleasure to the owner but was erected and is maintained by him
... with the malicious motive of injuring another by shutting out his light, air and view."
I AM. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners § 106 (1962).
24. See, e.g., Giller, 162 Ind. at 21, 69 N.E. at 549; Mahan, 13 Wend. at 264. The
courts fail to explain why there is no right to light. Their stance is apparently based on a
belief that, because sunlight is of little commercial value and land development is of great
value, a landowner's interest in access to sunlight does not deserve legal protection. Com-
ment, Private Nuisance, supra note 11, at 105.
25. See, e.g., Letts, 54 Ohio St. at 81-82, 42 N.E. at 766; Metzger, 107 Wis. at 270-71,
83 N.W. at 309-10. The problem with this view is that motive is frequently used as a factor
in determining the legality of conduct. Comment, Private Nuisance, supra note 11, at 99
n.36.
Some courts have gone so far as to hold that motive is irrelevant and that spite fences
blocking sunlight do not invade a legal right. See, e.g., Giller, 162 Ind. at 21, 69 N.E. at
549; Mahan, 13 Wend. at 264.
26. See, e.g., Letts, 54 Ohio St. at 82-83,42 N.E. at 766-67; Musumeci v. Leonardo, 77
R.I. 255, 261, 75 A.2d 175, 178 (1950). This view is erroneous, since many nuisances do not
involve the physical invasion of property. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Griffin v. Northridge, 67 Cal. App. 2d 69, 153 P.2d 800 (1944); Hornsby
v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20 (1941); Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 95 Idaho 367, 509
P.2d 785 (1973); Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888); Bush v. Mockett, 95
Neb. 552, 145 N.W. 1001 (1914); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N.C. 433, 66 S.E. 439 (1909);
Schork v. Epperson, 74 Wyo. 286, 287 P.2d 467 (1955); Erickson v. Hudson, 70 Wyo. 317,
249 P.2d 523 (1952). A handful of courts continue to deny a nuisance cause of action for
spite fences. See Taliaferro v. Salyer, 162 Cal. App. 2d 685, 328 P.2d 799 (1958); Musumeci,
77 R.I. 255, 75 A.2d 175; Harrison v. Langlinais, 312 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
28. See, e.g., Hornsby, 191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20; Sundowner, 95 Idaho 367, 509 P.2d
1983-84]
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lawful use of property.29 A few cases in this majority support the
existence of a legal right to sunlight °.3  Another approach imposes
liability if spite is the dominant purpose, or if the structure's use-
ful purpose is clearly incidental.3 Finally, some courts employ a
balancing analysis, weighing the harm caused by the spite fence
against the fence's utility.32 Nuisance liability flows if the harm
outweighs the utility.33
Prior to Prah, courts were unwilling to expand the scope of
nuisance protection beyond spite fences to cover obstruction of
sunlight. In the leading case, Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-
Five Twenty-Five, Inc. , the court rejected a nuisance cause of
action, employing a two-step rationale. First, the court concluded
that nuisance law permits a landowner to put his property to any
use that does not deprive his neighbor of a legal right.35 Then, the
court found no legal right to sunlight, citing and rejecting the an-
cient lights doctrine.36 It therefore concluded that there can be no
785; Burke, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838; Bush, 95 Neb. 552, 145 N.W. 1001; Barger, 151
N.C. 433, 66 S.E. 439.
29. See Hornsby, 191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20; Burke, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838;
Barger, 151 N.C. 433, 66 S.E. 439.
30. One court stated:
The air and light no matter from which direction they come are God-given, and
are essential to the life, comfort, and happiness of everyone. Under the rules of
law, they may be properly and justifiably interfered with to a limited extent in
order to secure benefits to others; but any departure from this limitation upon
such interference that benefitted no one, and is done solely from malice, is an
invasion of the right to light and air ....
Hornsby, 191 Ga. at 500, 13 S.E.2d at 25; see also Burke, 69 Mich. at 389, 37 N.W. at 842
("The right to breathe the air, and to enjoy the sunshine is a natural one."); Barger, 151
N.C. at 437, 66 S.E. at 440-41 ("Light and air are as much a necessity as water and all are
the common heritage of mankind.").
31. See Griffin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 69, 153 P.2d 800.
32. See Schork, 74 Wyo. 286, 287 P.2d 467. In Schork, the court adopted the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts approach to spite fence liability. If spite is the sole purpose the
structure constitutes a nuisance per se. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829 (1979).
If spite is not the sole purpose the court balances the utility of defendant's conduct against
the harm to plaintiff. See id. § 826 comment e. This approach is supported, at least in
dictum, by several other courts. See, e.g., Bush, 95 Neb. at 556, 145 N.W. at 1002; Erickson,
70 Wyo. at 341, 249 P.2d at 532.
33. This approach offers support for Prah, in which the court adopted the same bal-
ancing analysis, albeit in a situation not involving spite. See infra notes 41-43 and accom-
panying text; cf. Comment, Private Nuisance, supra note 11, at 102 (balancing analysis
adopted in Schork is encouraging, but court unlikely to apply it to situations not involving
malice).
34. 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); see also Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fi-
berglass Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1971); Wolf v. Forcum, 130 Ind.
App. 10, 161 N.E.2d 175 (1959).
35. 114 So. 2d at 359.
36. Id.
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nuisance action for obstructing sunlight.37
The flaw in this reasoning is twofold. First, the ancient lights
doctrine is a legal anachronism having no bearing on the viability
of a nuisance action for sunlight obstruction. The doctrine was
simply a nonexclusive means of acquiring a negative easement to
sunlight.38 More importantly, the Fountainbleau court's premise,
that there is no legal right to sunlight, should have been its conclu-
sion.39 The court offered no policy reasons for barring landown-
ers from protecting their access to sunlight through nuisance
actions." In Prah v. Maretti, the court did engage in a policy
analysis, concluding that per se exclusion from nuisance coverage
of a landowner's interest in access to sunlight is unjustified.
B. Prah v. Maretti
In Prah, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a solar
energy user has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted by
alleging that his neighbor's construction of a home will obstruct
his access to sunlight.4 The court recognized a private nuisance
cause action under the reasonable use doctrine of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.42 The court did not, however, reach a decision
37. Id.
38. Comment, Securing Energy Rights, supra note 11, at 136.
39. See Comment, Private Nuisance, supra note 11, at 99; Comment, Guaranteeing a
Place, supra note 11, at 125 n.126; see also G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 172 n.13.
A0. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, commenting on per se exclu-
sions from the nuisance balance, provided: "These judicial crystallizations, however,
should not obscure the fact that in every case the question is one of reasonableness. They
are constantly re-examined in the light of changing community conditions and views."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 comment e (1979). Describing the flexibility of
nuisance law, one commentator has noted: "Automobiles when they first appeared were
nuisances to horse travel; as cars began to swamp horse-drawn vehicles in number, horses
were properly perceived as the nuisance." Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 731 (1973).
Two additional rationales have been proffered by courts limiting a nuisance action for
obstruction of sunlight. First, some courts exhibit a strong bias in favor of property owner-
ship. As one court stated, "The 'ability' of appellants to 'maintain' their dwelling is not a
legal right which was violated or invaded by the lawful use of the appellees of their own
premises in erecting a building thereon which did not reach appellants' property in a physi-
cal sense." Wolf v. Forcum, 130 Ind. App. 10, 16, 161 N.E.2d 175, 178 (1959). Second,
courts seem to be motivated by a largely unarticulated view that obstruction of sunlight
differs from other nuisances. This view, set forth in early cases denying a nuisance cause of
action for spite fences, was not questioned in subsequent cases upholding such a cause of
action. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
41. 108 Wis. 2d at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191. For an excellent discussion of the Prah
facts, see Recent Development, Casting a Shadow, supra note 11, at 948-49.
42. 108 Wis. 2d at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191. Under the reasonable use doctrine, inva-
sion of a person's use or enjoyment of land is a private nuisance if unreasonable. The
1983-84]
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on the merits of plaintiff's claim.4 3
Justice Abrahamson, writing for the majority, first reviewed
the limited common law view of access to sunlight.44 She ob-
served that the doctrine of ancient lights had been unanimously
rejected in this country as inconsistent with the need for rapid
land development. 45 Only in two narrow instances does the com-
mon law protect a landowner's interest in access to sunlight: ac-
tions based on express easements to sunlight,4 6 and nuisance
actions for malicious obstruction of sunlight (i.e., spite fences).47
Acknowledging the reluctance of early courts to protect a
landowner's access to sunlight, Justice Abrahamson identified
three traditional justifications for that stance.48 Most prominent
was the undisputed right of every landowner to use his property as
he pleased, so long as he caused no physical harm to his neigh-
bor.4 9 In addition, sunlight was valued only for the illumination
or aesthetic enjoyment it provided-not as an energy re-
source-and its loss was given little, if any, weight by society.5"
Finally, the traditional view reflected a strong interest in unim-
unreasonableness of the invasion is determined by balancing the utility of the actor's con-
duct against the gravity of the harm inflicted. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS §§ 8211D-
831 (1979). For a thorough discussion of the application of the reasonable use rule to solar
access disputes, see infra notes 121-65 and accompanying text.
43. 108 Wis. 2d at 242-43, 321 N.W.2d at 192. The case was remanded to the trial
court for such a determination. Id. The parties settled on January 17, 1984, the day the
case had been set for trial. The trial court issued the following order, prohibiting the par-
ties from disclosing the terms of the settlement:
The parties to this lawsuit have been involved in this matter for over three
years and . . . have settled their differences to their mutual satisfaction. It is
agreed that the lawsuit is dismissed upon its merits ....
This matter has been a substantial burden on each of these parties and has
greatly divided the neigborhood in which they live and their respective families.
In the interest of putting this dispute behind them and in an effort to achieve
harmony in the neighborhood the parties have agreed not to comment on the
resolution of the dispute.
The court has encouraged the parties in their resolution of this lawsuit and
therefore orders that neither party comment further on this matter.
Letter from John F. Maloney to Shawn Lyden (Mar. 22, 1984) (enclosing statement by the
court upon settlement) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
44. 108 Wis. 2d at 233-35, 321 N.W.2d at 188-89.
45. Id. at 233-34, 321 N.W.2d at 188; see supra note 17.
46. 108 Wis. 2d at 233, 321 N.W.2d at 188; see supra note 18.
47. 108 Wis. 2d at 234-35, 321 N.W.2d at 188-89; see supra notes 27-33 and accompa-
nying text.
48. 108 Wis. 2d at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
49. Id. (citing Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900), in which
Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to recognize nuisance action for maintenance of spite
fence); see also supra notes 25 & 40 and accompanying text.
50. 108 Wis. 2d at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189. Because sunlight was little valued and land
development was greatly valued, courts failed to find a right to sunlight. See supra note 24.
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peded land development.5'
The Prah court examined these policies, concluding that
"[t]hey reflect factual circumstances and social priorities that are
now obsolete."52 The "sovereignty" of the landowner has lost
considerable vitality in the last hundred years, as government has
increasingly regulated land use for the public welfare.53 Also, ac-
cess to sunlight now has greater economic significance54 both to
the individual investor in solar energy, and to society which has
an interest in developing alternative energy resources. 5 Finally,
unimpeded land development is no longer inherently desirable. 6
Thus, asserting that "[c]ourts should not implement obsolete poli-
cies that have lost their vigor over the course of the years,"'57 Jus-
tice Abrahamson concluded that "It]he law of private nuisance is
better suited to resolve landowners' disputes about property devel-
opment in the 1980's than is a rigid rule which does not recognize
a landowner's interest in access to sunlight."58 The Prah court
adopted the reasonable use doctrine to resolve solar access dis-
putes because it has the flexibility to protect both a landowner's
interest in developing his land and his neighbor's interest in access
to sunlight.59
Justice Callow, the lone dissenter, raised many of the standard
arguments against recognizing a private nuisance action for ob-
struction of solar access. He initially disputed the obsolescence of
the three traditional policy justifications cited by the majority.60
51. 108 Wis. 2d at 235, 321 N.W.2d at 189. Cases rejecting the ancient lights doctrine
best illustrate this view. See, eg., Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316 (1875); Pierre v. Fernald, 26
Me. 436 (1847); Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1 (1858); Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1838).
52. 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
53. Id. (relying on two zoning cases, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), and Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972)).
54. 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
55. Id. To support this assertion, the court referred to federal and state legislation
encouraging solar energy use. Id. at n.11.
56. Id. at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190.
57. Id.
58. Id. The court then briefly discussed State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407
(1974), in which it had rejected the common enemy rule and adopted the reasonable use
rule to resolve surface water disputes. The majority relied upon Deetz to support its hold-
ing, reading it "as an endorsement of the application of common law nuisance to situations
involving the conflicting interests of landowners and as rejecting per se exclusions to the
nuisance law reasonable use doctrine." Id. For a complete discussion of the law of surface
waters and its similarities to solar access law, see infra notes 68-115 and accompanying
text.
59. 108 Wis. 2d at 239-40, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
60. Id. at 244-48, 321 N.W.2d at 193-95. The dissent argued rather sardonically in a
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Even if those policies were obsolete, he added, it was for the legis-
lature, not the judiciary, to so determine.6 1  Justice Callow as-
serted that the cause of action recognized by the majority will
thwart the policy of encouraging peaceful compromise between
neighbors.62  He contended, moreover, that obstruction of solar
footnote that instead of the obstruction, solar collectors may themselves constitute the nui-
sance. Id. at 248 n.3, 321 N.W.2d at 195 n.3. This would certainly be true, stated Justice
Callow, if collector glare temporarily blinded automobile drivers, reflected excessive heat
into adjacent buildings, or otherwise annoyed neighbors. Id. Although this point has some
merit, proper precautions in building and installing the collectors should minimize the risk
of legal action. S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 139 (1978).
61. 108 Wis. 2d at 248, 321 N.W.2d at 195. As the dissent correctly pointed out, the
Wisconsin legislature has addressed the solar access issue. However, contrary to the argu-
ments of Justice Callow, the legislation is very narrowly drawn and therefore was not likely
intended to preempt judicial activity. The statute referred to by the Prah dissent enables
municipalities to adopt solar access permit ordinances. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.032 (West
Supp. 1983). Under such legislation, a current or prospective solar energy user may apply
to a local government agency for a solar access permit. Id. § 66.032(3)(a). After notice is
given to the applicant's neighbors, id. § 66.032(3)(b), the agency may conduct a hearing, id.
§ 66.032(4), and must grant a permit if it determines: (1) that the granting of the permit
will not "unreasonably interfere with the orderly land development plans of the municipal-
ity"; (2) that no person has shown that he has applied for a building permit for, spent $500
on the planning or designing of, or substantially undertaken planning or construction of a
structure that would interfere with the applicant's solar access; and (3) that the benefits to
the applicant and the public will exceed the burdens, id § 66.032(5)(a). If granted, the
permit must be recorded. Id. § 66.032(6). The remedy for an "impermissible interference"
is damages, including court costs and reasonable attorney fees, unless the interference is
caused by vegetation, in which case an injunction may be sought. .d. § 66.032(7).
Another statute allows a solar energy user to seek compensation for any obstruction of
solar access by a structure outside a neighbor's "building envelope," as defined by the
zoning requirements in effect when the solar unit is installed. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.41(1)
(West Supp. 1983). A "building envelope" is a "3-dimensional area on a lot on which
building is permitted, as defined by the existing ground level and by any applicable height
restriction, setback requirement, side yard requirement or rear yard requirement." Id.
§ 700.41(2)(a).
Wisconsin also has passed other solar access legislation. See Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59.97(1), 62.23(7)(c) (West Supp. 1983) (county zoning agencies and municipalities may
consider solar access in carrying out zoning authority); id. § 66.031 (municipal govern-
ments may enact ordinances providing for trimming of vegetation obstructing solar access);
id. § 700.35 (solar access easements).
For a thorough analysis of the permit and building envelope statutes and their relation-
ship to the private nuisance remedy, see Comment, Power of the Sun, supra note 11, at
1289-97. The author concludes that "nuisance law is very flexible and will probably be
used to fill in any gaps left in the legislation ... . [I]t is the complementary and cumula-
tive aspects of the [legislation] and nuisance law which is [sic] striking." Id. at 1297; see
also Recent Development, Casting a Shadow, supra note 11, at 952 n.69 ("Nuisance law is
well suited to handle the cases that slip between the permit scheme and restrictive cove-
nants."). This Note, although agreeing with the basic premise that nuisance law is a useful
complement to legislation, proposes integration of nuisance law with more widely accepted
legislative approaches-namely, express easements, zoning, and subdivision regulation.
See infra notes 169-218 and accompanying text.
62. 108 Wis. 2d at 246 n.2, 321 N.W.2d at 193 n.2. This concern can be met if the
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access is not an "invasion" of the use or enjoyment of land as that
term is used in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.63 "Invasion" is
synonymous with "the incoming or spread of something hurt-
ful,"'  such as noise or noxious odors. Justice Callow argued fur-
ther that new construction threatening obstruction of solar access
will usually be in compliance with applicable zoning laws and
building codes. This compliance would prevent the courts from
declaring the construction a private nuisance.65 Finally, he as-
serted that a private nuisance action is unsupportable because a
landowner using a solar energy system is putting his property to
an unusually sensitive use.66
In examining Prah, Justice Callow's critique of the court's pol-
icy analysis must be given serious consideration. 67 After all, with
private nuisance approach is supplemented by a solar access easement statute. See infra
notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
63. 108 Wis. 2d at 250-51, 321 N.W.2d at 196.
64. Id. (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1188 (P. Gove ed. 1966)). This definition is contrary to
nuisance law. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
65. 108 Wis. 2d at 253-54, 321 N.W.2d at 196-97. The defendant in Prah had received
approval for his proposed construction from the local architectural control committee and
the city planning commission. Id. at 226, 321 N.W.2d at 185. Under the modem view,
compliance with zoning laws does not prevent an activity from being declared a nuisance.
It is simply another factor in determining the utility of the actor's conduct. See infra notes
152-53 and accompanying text.
66. 108 Wis. 2d at 251-53, 321 N.W.2d at 196-97. Although unusually sensitive uses
are generally not entitled to protection in a nuisance action, it is debatable whether a court
would deem a solar energy system an unusually sensitive use. See infra notes 132-37 and
accompanying text.
Justice Callow also contended that the majority's holding "thwarts the very foundation
of property law"--the need for apprising prospective purchasers of any limitations on their
use of property. 108 Wis. 2d at 254, 321 N.W.2d at 198. According to the dissent, defend-
ant had no notice of plaintiffs use of solar collectors. Id. This argument is simply contrary
to the facts of the case. See Recent Development, Casting a Shadow, supra note 11, at
952-53 n.72. Further, had there been no notice plaintiff likely would have lost on the mer-
its, since the requirement of an intentional invasion would not have been satisfied. See
infra note 138.
67. See 108 Wis. 2d at 244-48, 321 N.W.2d at 193-95. The policies of land develop-
ment and landowner freedom are addressed infra notes 76-77 & 98-103 and accompanying
text. Regarding the increased significance of sunlight as an energy source, the dissent
stated: "Solar energy for home heating is at this time sparingly used and of questionable
economic value because solar collectors are not mass produced, and consequently, they are
very costly. Their limited efficiency may explain the lack of production." 108 Wis. 2d at
247, 321 N.W.2d at 194. Justice Callow's remarks betray fundamental misconceptions of
solar energy development and use. Before investment in solar energy can become wide-
spread, such misconceptions must be dispelled. First, solar energy use for home heating is
already substantial and steadily increasing. In 1981, for example, there were 300,000 active
solar water and heating systems in place in this country, compared with only 20,000 in
1974. S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 75 (Supp. 1984). Approximately 10,000 new buildings
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little or no supporting precedent, the court was brushing aside a
formidable body of contrary authority largely based on its percep-
tions of a change in the policies bearing on solar access. However,
a review of the analogous body of law governing surface water
disputes reveals that the Prah court's analysis and conclusion are
justifiable.
C. Analogy to Surface Water Disputes
1. The Law of Surface Waters
Three principal liability rules govern interference with the
natural flow of surface waters.68 The civil law rule, effectively a
used passive solar design in 1980 and that number is doubling each year. Bezdek,
Wendling, Bennington & Chew, National Goals for Solar Energy.- Economic and Social
Implications, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 338, 352 (1982). Further, reasonable estimates indi-
cate that solar could provide between one-fifth and one-fourth of America's energy needs
by the year 2000. ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 1, at 183. Second, although the initial
investment in solar energy may be considered high, it is "clear that solar energy is far more
'economic' than conventionally assumed." Id. at 193. The average cost of a professionally
installed combined active solar space heating and hot water system is $15,000, while a kit
or owner-built system can cost as little as $2000. Passive heating systems range in price
from $5000 to $10,000. Conservation & Renewable Energy Inquiry & Referral Serv., Re-
newable Energy: An Overview (February, 1982) (on file with the Case Western Reserve
Law Review). The prospect of investing in solar is made much more attractive when one
considers that many states grant sales and income tax exemptions, as well as income tax
credits. See S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 55-57 (Supp. 1984) (listing solar tax incentive
measures by state). The federal government and some states have also passed legislation
designed to facilitate the availability of financing for the purchase of solar systems. See id.
at 58-62. Of course, one must also consider the substantial fuel savings which can result
from investing in solar technology. The plaintiff in Prah, for example, had saved $600 per
year in fuel costs. Brief for United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 10 n.7. Finally,
the solar industry in this country is booming. In 1981, 3500 solar manufacturers were oper-
ating, compared with only 50 in 1974. Moreover, the industry is growing at an annual rate
of 37%. S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 75 (Supp. 1984).
68. Surface water is "water from rain, melting snow, springs or seepage, or detached
from subsiding floods, that lies or flows on the surface of the earth but does not form a part
of a watercourse or lake." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 846 (1979). Controversies
involving the use of surface water also arise, although not as frequently as disputes con-
cerning interference with its flow. See id. comment b. The common law rule, codified in
some state statutes and the Restatement, is that a landowner has absolute ownership of the
surface water on his land. See Davis, The Law of Diffsed Surface Water in Eastern Ripa-
rian States, 6 CONN. L. REV. 227, 229 & n.4 (1973) (stating rule and collecting surface
water use cases by state); Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?, 8
NAT. RESOURCES J. 72, 107-11 (1968) (discussing common law rule and statutory develop-
ments); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 864 (1979) ("possessor of land is not subject
to liability for a use of surface water on his land that interferes with another person's use of
the water, unless the use is made for the primary purpose of causing the harm"). The
leading article on the subject of surface water, however, presents the argument that the
cases universally involve a beneficial use of surface water. The authors contend that by
inference this supports application of the reasonable use rule to situations involving the use
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rule of strict liability, imposes liability for any alteration of the
natural flow of surface waters which interferes with another's in-
terest in the use and enjoyment of land.6 9 Under this rule, adjoin-
ing parcels of land are "subject to a natural servitude for the
natural flow of surface water across" them."° Thus, the owner of
the lower land cannot obstruct the flow of surface water from the
upper land without incurring liability to that land's owner.7 ' Sim-
ilarly, the owner of the upper land is liable for increasing or di-
verting the flow of surface water onto the lower land.72 The
rationale for adoption of the civil law rule was that enforcing the
natural laws of drainage is the least harmful and most peaceful
way to resolve surface water disputes.73 A few courts continue to
adhere to the pure civil law rule.74
The common enemy rule, the polar opposite of the civil law
rule, provides that landowners have an absolute legal right to in-
terfere with the natural flow of surface water, regardless of the
harm to adjoining land. 5 Courts have asserted two principal jus-
tifications for adopting the common enemy rule: the right of a
of surface water as well as those involving interference with its flow. Kinyon & McClure,
Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REv. 891, 914-15 (1940).
69. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 68, at 893. See generally Long & Long, Surface
Waters and the CivilLaw Rule, 23 EMORY L.J. 1015 (1974) (providing comprehensive anal-
ysis of civil law rule, concluding that rule does not inhibit land development and that
modifications of rule produce fair and predictable results).
70. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 68, at 893-94.
71. Id. at 894.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 895. According to Kinyon and McClure, this is "[t]he real reason for the
rule," although courts stated that they were relying on the maxim aqua currit et debet cur-
rere, ut currere solebat, id. at 894-95, which translates "[w]ater runs, and ought to run, as it
has used to run," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 95 (5th ed. 1979).
74. See, e.g., Gill v. First Christian Church, Inc., 216 Ga. 454, 117 S.E.2d 164 (1960);
Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Engell, 251 Miss. 855, 171 So. 2d 860 (1965).
Most courts utilizing the civil law rule have modified it. The modifications generally
recognize that strict application of the rule may seriously impede land development and
improvement. Note, The Application of Surface Water Rulps in Urban Areas, 42 Mo. L.
RPv. 76, 79-81 (1977). The first modification, the "urban-rural" modification, continues to
apply the civil law rule in rural areas, but applies either the common enemy or reasonable
use rule in urban areas. Id. at 79-80; see, e.g., Dekle v. Vann, 279 Ala. 153, 182 So. 2d 885
(1966) (adopting common enemy rule for urban areas); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186
N.W.2d 884 (1971) (adopting reasonable use rule for urban areas). A second modification
is the "reasonable use" modification which superimposes a reasonableness test on the civil
law rule. See, e.g., Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
The third modification, the "good husbandry" modification, provides that the owner of the
upper land can accelerate the flow of surface water as required by good husbandry. No
liability is incurred to the owner of the lower land so long as the water is not diverted from
its natural path. See, e.g., Garbarino v. Van Cleave, 214 Or. 554, 330 P.2d 28 (1958).
75. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 68, at 898.
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landowner to do as he pleases on his own land7 6 and the inherent
desirability of land development and improvement.77 A handful
of modem courts apply the pure common enemy rule.78
The reasonable use rule "occupies the middle ground" be-
tween the civil law and common enemy rules.7 9 In jurisdictions
adhering to this rule, landowners are not totally prohibited from
interfering with the natural flow of surface water, nor are they
granted a license to interfere with surface water drainage without
regard for their neighbor's interests.8 0 Any reasonable use of land
is permissible, even if it alters the flow of surface water and dam-
ages adjoining land.8 1 Reasonableness is a question of fact, deter-
mined in each case "in accordance with general principles of
fairness and common sense."82
Courts have adopted the reasonable use rule in recognition of
the significant disadvantages of the other rules. The civil law rule,
although it generates predictable results,83 may seriously impede
land development and improvement. 4 The common enemy rule
also ensures predictable results,8 5 minimizes litigation, and en-
76. Id.; see Grant v. Allen, 41 Conn. 156, 160 (1874); Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y. 459,
466-67 (1864).
77. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 68, at 898-99; see Niringer v. Norwood, 72 Ala.
277, 280 (1882); Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 148 (1881). A third justification for the
common enemy rule is that it was the rule under English common law. Kinyon & Mc-
Clure, supra note 68, at 899.
78. See, e.g., Cloverleaf Farms, Inc. v. Surratt, 169 Ind. App. 554, 349 N.E.2d 731
(1976); Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Maine 1978); Sanco Sales, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Bay Transp. Auth., 356 Mass. 725, 252 N.E.2d 214 (1969); Tillinger v. Frisbee, 138 Mont.
60, 353 P.2d 645 (1960).
Most courts originally adhering to the common enemy rule have modified it because
strict application of the rule invites unreasonable behavior. The "collection and discharge"
modification provides that a landowner may not collect large quantities of surface water
and discharge it onto adjoining land. Note, supra note 74, at 87; see, e.g., Miller v. Darby,
336 Mass. 243, 143 N.E.2d 816 (1957). The "due care" modification permits a landowner
to interfere with the natural flow of surface water so long as he does so with due care,
reasonable care, or without negligence. Note, supra note 74, at 88; see, e.g., Nichol v.
Yocum, 173 Neb. 298, 113 N.W.2d 195 (1962).
79. Maloney & Plager, supra note 68, at 79-80.
80. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 68, at 904.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 904-05; see infra note 90.
83. Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 269, 275, 341 A.2d 735, 738, 741 (1975). The numer-
ous exceptions to the civil law rule result in uncertainty and reduce the rule's predictability.
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 215, 236 S.E.2d 787, 796 (1977); Butler, 115 R.I. at
274-75, 341 A.2d at 741.
84. See, e.g., Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 208, 236 S.E.2d at 791; McGlashan v. Spade
Rockledge Terrace Condo Dev. Corp., 62 Ohio St. 2d 55, 56, 402 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (1980);
Butler, 115 R.I. at 269, 341 A.2d at 738.
85. Butler, 115 R.I. at 268, 274, 341 A.2d at 737, 741. As with the civil law rule, the
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courages the development and improvement of land. 6 However,
it encourages self-help and creates bitter conflicts between adjoin-
ing landowners.87 Both rules have been further criticized for
framing surface water issues in terms of rigid property law con-
cepts.88 Use of property law terminology only results in confusion
and inconsistency because, although the rules began as strict prop-
erty law theories, they have been consistently modified by tort
concepts to alleviate harsh results.89
The most significant advantage of the reasonable use rule is
flexibility-reasonableness is determined after consideration of
the totality of circumstances in a given case. 90 Moreover, unlike
numerous modifications of the common enemy rule produce uncertainty and decrease pre-
dictability. Id. at 274-75, 341 A.2d at 741.
86. Id. at 268, 341 A.2d at 737.
87. See, e.g., id. at 268, 341 A.2d at 738. "'[L]andowners are encouraged to engage in
contests of hydraulic engineering in which might makes right, and breach of peace is inevi-
table.'" 1d. (quoting Maloney & Plager, supra note 66, at 78); see also Rounds v. Hoel-
scher, 428 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 207,236 S.E.2d
at 79 1.
88. See, e.g., Rounds, 428 N.E.2d at 1311-12; Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 215, 236 S.E.2d
at 795; McGlashan, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 59, 402 N.E.2d at 1199; Butler, 115 R.I. at 269-70, 341
A.2d at 738. As the Butler court aptly stated:
Both the common-enemy and the civil-law rules are encrusted with the verbi-
age that is usually associated with the law of real property. When they are used,
one hears such terms as easements, the dominant estate, the servient estate, and
servitudes, and the classicist has the opportunity to try his hand at translating
such ponderous Latin phrases as cu/js est solum, e/ius usque ad coelum et ad infer-
nos or aqua currit, et debet currere ut currere solebat.
115 R.I. at 269-70, 341 A.2d at 738.
89. See, e.g., Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 215-16, 236 S.E.2d at 795-96; Butler, 115 R.I. at
271, 341 A.2d at 739.
90. See, eg., Rounds, 428 N.E.2d at 1311-12; Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320,
330, 120 A.2d 4, 10 (1956); Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 216-17, 236 S.E.2d at 796-97; Butler,
115 R.I. at 275, 341 A.2d at 741. Faced with the argument that certainty should be favored
over flexibility, the Butler court responded. "[A] desire for certainty of liability should not
and must not serve as a judicial pardon for the unreasonable conduct which has been
manifested by any landowner in our modem society." 115 R.I. at 275, 341 A.2d at 741.
A number of courts have articulated the factors they will Ponsider under the reasonable
use test. See, eg., Rounds, 428 N.E.2d at 1315 (improvements as cause in fact of injury,
nature and importance of improvements, relative value of harm compared to improve-
ments, forseeability of injury, extent of interference with flow of water, availability of mu-
tual solutions to drainage problems, and negligence or willful misconduct by party seeking
to control surfce water); Butler, 115 R.I. at 273-74, 341 A.2d at 740 (reasonable necessity
for drainage, reasonable care in avoiding damage, benefit to land drained compared with
harm, and reasonableness of means of diverting water). Other courts have explicitly
adopted the reasonable use doctrine of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See, e.g., Mc-
Glashan, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 59-60, 402 N.E.2d at 1200; State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 16-18,
224 N.W.2d 407, 415-16 (1974). For a discussion of this test, see infra notes 138-54 and
accompanying text. Since the Restatement is basically a codification and clarification of the
common law, the results should be the same.
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the civil law rule, the reasonable use rule is not a serious impedi-
ment to land improvement and development.9' By forcing land-
owners to consider the true costs to the community before
developing their land, the rule also discourages the type of unrea-
sonable behavior condoned by the common enemy rule.92 Fi-
nally, the reasonable use rule correctly treats interference with
surface water drainage as a matter of tort liability, focusing on
"practical and concrete problems . . rather than on the limita-
tions and qualifications of a categorical 'right' or 'servitude'
presupposedly assumed and ill-defined. '93 An increasing number
of courts are rejecting the common enemy and civil law rules in
favor of the reasonable use rule.94
2. Analogy to Solar Access
Like obstruction of sunlight, interference with the flow of sur-
face waters is a source of litigation between adjoining landowners.
Moreover, both sunlight and surface water flow naturally across
property lines, 9 5 and, when the natural path of either is altered,
91. See, e.g.,Armstrong, 20 N.J. at 330, 120 A.2d at 10; Butler, 115 R.I. at 274, 341
A.2d at 741.
92. Butler, 115 R.I. at 274, 341 A.2d at 741. The reasonable use doctrine, unlike the
common enemy rule, produces "a more equitable allocation of the costs of.. . improve-
ments, for the owner improving his land must take into consideration the true cost of such
development to the community." Id
93. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 68, at 939; see, e.g., Rounds, 428 N.E.2d at
1309-10; AeGlashan, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 59-60, 402 N.E.2d at 1199-1200.
94. In 1940, when Kinyon and McClure published their article urging courts to adopt
the reasonable use rule, only Minnesota and New Hampshire had done so. See Sheehan v.
Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, 61 N.W. 462 (1894); Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870). Since then,
approximately 11 states have explicitly adopted the rule. See Weinberg v. Northern
Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1960); Page Motor Co. v. Baker, 438 A.2d 739
(Conn. 1980); Weldin Farms, Inc. v. Glassman, 414 A.2d 500 (Del. 1980); Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970);Armstrong, 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4; Pendergrast,
293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787; Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967); Mc-
Glashan, 62 Ohio St. 2d 55, 402 N.E.2d 1196; Butler, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735; Sanford v.
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971); Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d
407. In addition, numerous states have effectively accepted the reasonable use rule by dras-
tic modification of the other rules. See, e.g., Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529,
50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966) (reasonable use modification of civil law rule).
95. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 10 n.7, Prah; see Com-
ment, Private Nuisance, supra note 11, at 104 ("Light and air are similar to
water-freeflowing elements that no one person can possess."); cf. Note, Obtaining Access,
supra note 11, at 368 ("Streams of light may be analogized to surface watercourses insofar
as rights to both attach to the flow and not the corpus."). But see S. KRAEMER, supra note
2, at 156 (1978) (unlike water, "[siunlight is an energy form that strikes similary located
surfaces approximately equally" and "is not channelized and is regularly reflected and
absorbed").
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the interests asserted by adjoining landowners are the same.9 6
The surface water rules and their policy rationales are mir-
rored in the views and policies regarding access to sunlight. For
example, the common enemy rule and its justifications have their
counterpart in the narrow common law view of access to sunlight
and its justifications. Both the common enemy rule and the com-
mon law view regarding access to sunlight are based on the denial
of a legal "right" to the unobstructed flow of surface water or sun-
light.97 Further, one of the principal policy justifications for the
common enemy rule-the need for unimpeded land develop-
ment 94-has also been asserted to support the narrow common
law view of access to sunlight.99 Likewise, the other rationale for
the common enemy rule-the cherished right of a landowner to
use his land as he pleaseslco has been used to justify a narrow
view of liability for obstructing sunlight.' 0' ThePrah majority as-
serted that these policies "reflect factual circumstances and social
priorities that are now obsolete"' 2 and that "[r]ecognition of a
nuisance claim for unreasonable obstruction of access to sunlight
will not prevent land development or unduly hinder the use of
adjoining land."' 3 Courts discarding the common enemy rule in
favor of the reasonable use rule in surface water suits concur with
and support these assertions." 4
96. On the one hand, a landowner is asserting his interest in developing or improving
his property. On the other hand, the adjoining landowner is asserting his interest in the
unobstructed flow of sunlight or surface water across the other's land. Admittedly, this
comparison between the competing interests is not flawless. For example, commentators
have pointed out that solar access disputes actually involve a conflict between an interest in
the use (not the flow) of sunlight and an interest in the use of land. See S. KRAEMER, supra
note 2, at 157; Comment, Private Nuisance, supra note 11, at 105. The analogy urged in this
Note is, however, at least as apt as one between solar access conflicts and disputes involving
competing interests in the use of water. See, e.g., Note, Obtaining Access, supra note 11, at
368-78 (surface watercourses); 16 J. MAR. L. REv. 435, 445-46 (subterranean percolating
waters).
97. See supra notes 24 & 75 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 17-20 & 51 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 20 & 49 and accompanying text.
102. 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
103. Id. at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
104. Assessing the modem significance of land development, the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated.
It is, of course, true that society has a great interest that land shall be developed
for the greater good. It is therefore properly a consideration in these cases
whether the utility of the possessor's use of his land outweighs the gravity of the
harm which results from his alteration of the flow of surface waters. But while
today's mass home building projects . . . are assuredly in the social good, no
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In sharp contrast to the common enemy rule, the civil law rule
recognizes a property "right" in the natural flow of surface water
across adjoining parcels of land. 0 5 Analogously, New Mexico 10 6
and Wyoming 1° 7 have enacted solar access legislation which pro-
vides for the acquisition of a "solar right," a property right to
sunlight. 10 8
The same reasons for adopting the reasonable use rule to re-
solve surface water disputes support its application to solar access
conflicts. Like the common enemy rule, 0 9 the common law gov-
erning access to sunlight may produce certain results, minimize
litigation, and facilitate development and improvement of land.
Nevertheless, it ignores the burgeoning interest in solar energy, 110
threatens to chill investment in solar,'11 and may even encourage
unreasonable conduct."2  On the other hand, a pure "solar rights"
reason suggests itself why, in justice, the economic costs incident to the expulsion
of surface waters . . . should be borne in every case by adjoining landowners
rather than by those who engage in such projects for profit.
Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 330, 120 A.2d 4, 10 (1956). Similarly, with respect
to the policy of unrestrained landowner freedom, the Wisconsin Supreme Court argued:
It is not a timeless rule of property. Rather, it is one that apparently served the
temporary purposes of society well in the da) of burgeoning national expansion
of the mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The concept that an owner
of real property can, in all cases, do as he pleases with his property is no longer in
harmony with the realities of our society.
State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 14-15, 224 N.W.2d 407, 414 (1974).
105. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
106. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-3-1 to -12 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
107. WYO. STAT. §§ 34-22-101 to -106 (Supp. 1983).
108. The New Mexico statute provides that "the right to use the natural resource of
solar energy is a property right, the exercise of which is to be encouraged and regulated by
the laws of this state. Such property right shall be known as a solar right." N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 47-3-4(A) (1978). A "solar right" is "a right to an unobstructed line-of-sight path
from a solar collector to the sun, which permits radiation from the sun to impinge directly
on the solar collector." Id. § 47-3- 3(B). The Wyoming statute contains similar language.
See Wyo. STAT. § 34-22-102(a)(ii) (Supp. 1983). Both statutes borrow the concepts of
"beneficial use" and "prior appropriation" from western water law to measure solar rights
and resolve disputes. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4(B) (1978); Wyo. STAT.
§ 34-22-103(b) (Supp. 1983). For a complete discussion of the New Mexico statute, see
Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 35-38.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
110. See supra note 67.
111. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. This would at least be so in states with
no solar access legislation. Chilling could also be a problem in jurisdictions with legisla-
tion if, in a widely publicized case such as Prah, the legislation does not provide a remedy
and a common law action is unavailable. Cf. Comment, Power OfSun, supra note 11, at
1293- 95 (had Wisconsin legislation been effective when Prah dispute arose, it would not
have afforded remedy).
112. See Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 239 n.13, 321 N.W.2d at 191 n.13 ("recognition ofaperse
exception to private nuisance law may invite unreasonable behavior").
[ ol. 34:367
SOLAR ACCESS
approach, while offering certain results like the civil law rule,"13
may seriously impede land development and improvement.'
1 4
The reasonable use doctrine is the ideal compromise between dia-
metric rules providing either for no "right" or for an absolute
"right" to the unobstructed flow of surface water or sunlight. The
Prah court recognized as much, echoing the advantages of the
reasonable use rule expressed by courts applying the rule to sur-
face water disputes."15
Although the reasonable use rule of nuisance law has much to
recommend it, applying the rule to the merits of a solar access case
is problematic, as pointed out by the Prah dissent. Moreover, a
nuisance solution to solar access has certain disadvantages which
can only be overcome by adoption of an integrated approach.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF A PRIVATE NUISANCE APPROACH TO
SOLAR AccEss
Application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts's reasonable
use doctrine to solar access disputes raises a number of significant
issues. They include: (1) whether obstruction of solar access is an
"invasion" of a solar energy consumer's interest in the use and
enjoyment of his land; 116 (2) whether solar energy systems are hy-
persensitive uses of property;" 7 (3) the relative weight of the vari-
ous factors to be used in determining the reasonableness of solar
access blockage; ' 8 and (4) the choice of relief-injunctive or
monetary." 9
113. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.114. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 38 (New Mexico act "apparently grants
solar right that is valid from sunup to sundown" which could unduly burden adjoining
land); Note, Access to Sunfight: New Mexico's Solar Rights Act, 19 NAT. REsouRcEs J.
957, 959-60 (1979) (statute seems to create absolute right; raises problems of unconstitu-
tional taking and inefficient land use). The New Mexico legislature apparently atttempted
to meet this criticism by amending the statute in 1983 to allow local governments to regu-
late solar rights by various land use tools. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-11(A) (Supp.
1983). Absent local regulation, certain restrictions on the claiming of the solar right are to
apply. See id. The Wyoming statute contains similar provisions. See Wyo. STAT.§§ 34-22-104, -105(b) (Supp. 1983).
115. See 108 Wis. 2d at 239-40, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
116. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text. This section of the Note considers
only solar obstruction by structures, as opposed to vegetation, because these cases will be
the most difficult from the perspective of aggrieved solar consumers.
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A. Definition of Private Nuisance
The Restatement defines private nuisance as "a nontrespassory
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land."' 2 ° The Prah dissent argued that obstruction of sunlight
does not satisfy the definition's "invasion" requirement. 121 When
first faced with nuisance claims for sunlight obstruction, courts
took this same position, indicating that a prerequisite to mainte-
nance of a nuisance action was the physical invasion of land.' 22
They argued that, unlike the release of smoke, noxious odors,
water, or dust, cutting off access to sunlight is the mere withhold-
ing of a benefit. As one court put it, "[a] man may be compelled
to keep his gas, smoke, odors and noise at home, but he cannot be
compelled to send his light and air abroad."' 1
23
This view belies the true scope of nuisance protection. "Inva-
sion" is not limited to physical invasion-nuisances are often
found when an activity results in discomfort, annoyance, or dis-
turbance of a landowner's peace of mind. 124 Examples include
junked automobiles, houses of prostitution, funeral homes, and
stored explosives. 125 Therefore, obstruction of solar access cannot
be excluded from the Restatement's definition of private
nuisance. 126
B. Signjficant Harm
"There is liability for a nuisance only to those to whom it
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979) (emphasis added); see also W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 591 (4th ed. 1971) ("[A] private nuisance is an
interference with the use and enjoyment of land.").
121. See 108 Wis. 2d at 250-51, 321 N.W.2d at 196;supra notes 63-64 and accompany-
ing text.
122. See cases cited supra note 26.
123. Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 82, 42 N.E. 765, 767 (1896) (citing Mullen v.
Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 139 (1869)).
124. See W. PROSSER, supra note 120, at 592-93; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
app. § 821D (1982).
125. See, e.g., Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S.W. 1046 (1923)
(stored explosives); Crawford v. Tyrell, 128 N.Y. 341, 28 N.E. 514 (1891) (house of prosti-
tution); Jordan v. Nesmith, 132 Okla. 226, 269 P. 1096 (1928) (funeral home); Foley v.
Harris, 223 Va. 20, 286 S.E.2d 186 (1982) (junked automoblies).
126. See Recent Development, Casting .4 Shadow, supra note 11, at 954-55 (Restate-
ment nuisance protection extends beyond physically invasive conduct); Comment, Power of
the Sun, supra note 11, at 1276-79 (courts have applied nuisance rules to nonphysical inva-
sions "for practical reasons"). Even assuming that a physical invasion is required, it is
arguable that obstruction of sunlight is such an invasion if one considers the shadows fall-
ing on property rather than the withholding of sunlight. S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 134
(1978).
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causes significant harm, of a kind that would be suffered by a nor-
mal person in the community or by property in normal condition
and used for a normal purpose." 127 The requirement that the
harm be "significant" should pose few difficulties for plaintiffs in
solar access nuisance actions; the requirement that the property be
used for "a normal purpose" is more troublesome.
The significant harm requirement contemplates "a real and
appreciable interference with the plaintiff's use or enjoyment of
his land."'128 Obstruction of solar access results in economic harm
from loss of investment in the solar equipment, reduced efficiency
of the system, and higher alternative fuel bills.129 Physical dam-
age may also occur in colder climates if shading causes the solar
collectors to freeze. 130 In either case, obstruction of solar access
produces much more than a "slight inconvenience or petty
annoyance."131
A critical hurdle for solar access nuisance plaintiffs will be the
hypersensitive use question.132 The leading cases on this issue in-
volve reflection of light on drive-in theater screens.' 33 The courts
have denied nuisance relief because reflected light does not harm
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979).
128. Id. comment c. In actions for damages, significant harm must have in fact been
suffered. Id. comment b. Injunctive relief, however, may be obtained against future harm
if the harm "would be significant if it occurred." Id.
129. S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 137 (1978); see also Becker, supra note 11, at 28-29
(substantial harm to individual from loss of investment and to community because solar
helps save fossil fuel and lowers pollution levels from power plants); Comment, Private
Nuisance, supra note 11, at 116 (economic loss from higher fuel bills and loss of solar
investment is significant harm). The plaintiff in Prah, for example, invested $18,000 in his
solar system which saved him $600 per year in fuel bills. Brief for United States of America
as Amicus Curiae at 5, 10 n.7. Expert testimony indicated that the threatened shading
would have resulted in a 5-10% loss of operating efficiency. 16 J. MAR. L. REV. 435, 436
n.8 (citing Brief for Appellant at A-27). This relatively low figure is probably based on the
fact that only defendant's chimney would cause shading. See id. n.7 (citing Brief for Ap-
pellant at A-26). In future cases, the degree of shading will likely be greater and thus the
harm more significant.
130. The plaintiff in Prah introduced evidence showing that the shading would cause
his solar collectors to freeze during the winter, resulting in damage to them and his home.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 6-7. Such a situation would undoubtedly
satisfy the significant harm requirement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F
comment d (1979) ("When an invasion involves a detrimental change in the physical con-
dition of land, there is seldom any doubt as to the significant character of the invasion.").
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F comment c (1979).
132. See G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 172-73; Comment, Private Nuisance, supra note
11, at 116 n.136; Comment, Securing Energy Rights, supra note 11, at 136-39; Comment,
Nuisance Deficiencies, supra note 11, at 873-79.
133. See, e.g., Belmar Drive-In Theater Co. v. Illinois State Highway Comm'n, 34 Ill.
2d 544, 216 N.E.2d 788 (1966); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 198
P.2d 847 (1948).
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those in the community who commit their property to a normal
use. 134 Courts should not, however, extend this view to solar ac-
cess cases. The importance of society's interest in developing the
solar energy alternative mandates such a conclusion. 135 Solar in-
vestment would certainly be chilled by judicial declarations that
solar systems are abnormal uses of property. Further, because so-
lar energy use is already substantial and steadily increasing, it is in
fact a normal use of property. 136 Finally, several cases support the
proposition that sensitive use does not bar nuisance protection,
but rather is only a factor in the balancing equation.'37
C. Reasonableness
Nuisance liability attaches under the Restatement upon a find-
ing that the invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoy-
ment of his land is intentional and unreasonable.138  An
intentional invasion is unreasonable if the gravity of the harm
outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct. 139 As in most nui-
sance suits, reasonableness will likely be the pivotal issue in solar
access cases.
134. Belmar, 34 Ill. 2d at 548-49, 216 N.E.2d at 791-92; Amphitheaters, 184 Or. at
349-52, 198 P.2d at 852-54. According to the Prah dissenter, solar access disputes fit under
the rule of the drive-in theater cases. 108 Wis. 2d at 252 n.6, 321 N.W.2d at 197 n.6 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F comment d, illustration 2 (1979)).
135. G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 173; Comment, Private Nuisance, supra note 11, at 116
n.136; Comment, Nuisance Defciencies, supra note 11, at 879. The Amphitheaters court
specifically stated that public policy, although not relevant in the case before it, is germane
to the hypersensitivity question. 184 Or. at 361-62, 198 P.2d at 857-58.
136. See data discussedsupra note 67. Gail Hayes has also pointed out that solar use is
less likely to be considered abnormal in sparsely populated areas than in metropolitan
regions. G. HAYES, supra note 11, at 173; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F
comment e (1979) (location, character, and habits of community relevant to normal use
issue).
137. See, e.g., Gronn v. Rogers Constr., Inc., 221 Or. 226, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1979). An invasion is intentional if
the actor "acts for the purpose of causing it" or "knows that it is resulting or is substantially
certain to result." Id. § 825. The purpose or knowledge requirement should pose no seri-
ous problem for plaintiffs in solar obstruction suits. In many cases, potential shading will
have been obvious during the planning stages of construction and knowledge may thereby
be inferred. Comment, Private Nuisance, supra note 11, at 116. In others, the solar user
will have notified his neighbor of the problem, imparting actual knowledge. Becker, supra
note 11, at 29. In Prah, for example, there may have been both constructive and actual
knowledge, as plaintiff's solar collectors were visible and defendant had been expressly
notified of shading problems prior to commencing construction. See Recent Development,
Casting a Shawdow, supra note 11, at 952-53 n.72.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979). Although this test must be
satisfied when injunctive relief is sought, a lesser showing may justify a damage award. See
id. comment f; infra note 155.
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1. Gravity of Harm
Assessment of the gravity of harm requires consideration of
the character and extent of the harm, the social value of the type
of use or enjoyment invaded, the suitability of that use or enjoy-
ment to the particular locality, and the burden on the injured
party to avoid the harm."4 The character of the harm from solar
obstruction will be economic loss and possibly tangible property
damage. The strongest cases will involve property damage.141 The
extent of harm depends upon the degree and duration of the inva-
sion.' 42 Economic harm in solar access cases will almost invaria-
bly be substantial, 43  and physical damage may also be
extensive." The duration of the interference from shading will
be "recurrent,"' 45 as interference would likely occur every sunny
day but not continuously throughout the day.
The social value 46 of solar energy use is great-the growing
body of state and federal legislation encouraging solar develop-
ment makes this clear. 1'" This factor should thus be given consid-
erable weight by courts. Solar energy systems are entirely suitable
to residential or rural areas where they are unlikely to conflict
with prevailing land use patterns. Conversely, they are far less
suitable to highly developed or urban areas. The ability of a solar
energy user to avoid the harm and the cost of such avoidance will
largely depend upon the particular facts of a case. 48
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 827 (1979). This list of factors is not exhaus-
tive. Id. comment b.
141. See id. comment d.
142. Id. comment c.
143. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
144. Had the solar collectors in Prah frozen, they not only would have cracked, but
also caused water damage to the home's interior because they were built into the roof.
Recent Development, Casting a Shadow, supra note 11, at 949 n.47 (quoting Brief for Ap-
pellant at A-27 to -28).
145. The Restatement classifies interferences as "momentary, temporary, recurrent or
continuous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 comment c (1979).
146. Social value ofa use "depends upon the extent to which that type of use advances
or protects the general public good." Id. comment f.
147. See S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 46-62 (Supp. 1984) (collecting federal and state
legislation providing financial incentives for solar development); infra notes 171-79 & 202-
14 (state solar access legislation).
148. Even ifa solar energy system can be moved to avoid shading, the burden and cost
of doing so would likely be excessive. Courts may consider, however, whether the solar
user could have minimized the possibility of shading when he originally installed his sys-
tem. See Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192 (although lower court concluded
that plaintiff could have avoided harm by better locating home, factor not conclusive); id.
at 256 n.8, 321 N.W.2d at 199 n.8 (Callow, J., dissenting) ("Mr. Prah could have avoided
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2. Utility of Conduct
The utility of the actor's conduct depends upon the social
value of the primary purpose of the conduct, the suitability of the
conduct to the particular locality, and the impracticability of
preventing or avoiding the invasion. 149 In solar access nuisance
suits, the primary purpose of defendants' conduct will be land de-
velopment. Although land development retains social value,1
5 0
that value has been steadily declining since the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.1 5 1 The importance assigned land
development in a given case will depend upon the nature of the
structure-a highrise apartment or office building are socially
more valuable than an individual residence.
The suitability of a use of land to a particular locality will
hinge to some extent on local zoning laws. Although the target
structures in actions for solar blockage will likely be in compli-
ance with local zoning ordinances, 52 this will not necessarily pro-
vide nuisance immunity. Rather, under the modem view espoused
by the Prah majority, such compliance is merely one factor in de-
termining the utility of an actor's conduct. 53 The practicability of
avoiding the shading of solar collectors will largely depend on the
facts of each case.1
54
3. Choice of Relief
Of the two forms of relief available under the Restatement, in-
junctions and monetary damages,1 55 injunctive relief is the most
this litigation by building his own home in the center of his lot.., and/or by purchasing
the adjoining lot. ... )
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1979).
150. Conduct "has social value if the general public good is in some way advanced or
protected by the encouragement and achievement of [its] purpose." Id. comment e.
151. See Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190.
152. G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 173.
153. 108 Wis. 2d at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192; see, e.g., N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLAN-
NING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 153.11 at 238-39 (1975); Beuscher &
Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 440, 453-55;
Note, Zoning Ordinances and Common Law Nuisance, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 860, 866
(1965).
154. In Prah, for instance, the evidence indicated that defendant could have avoided
the shading merely by relocating his chimney. Recent Development, Casting a Shadow,
supra note 11, at 969 n.166 (citing Brief for Appellant at A-26, -29).
155. In addition to a finding of unreasonableness, the Restatement requires a further
inquiry to determine the appropriateness of injuctive relief. This inquiry involves a com-
parative appraisal of the following factors: (1) the nature of the interest to be protected, (2)
the relative adequacy of noninjunctive relief, (3) laches, (4) the unclean hands doctrine, (5)
the relative hardship to defendant if an injunction is granted and to plaintiff if it is denied
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desirable remedy for solar access obstruction.1 56 The motivations
for solar energy investment-conserving fossil fuels, avoiding pol-
lution, and acquiring the ability to control one's own energy
source-would not be protected by a damage remedy. 157 More-
over, relegating plaintiffs to damages might deter new solar
investment.
Conflicts between residential landowners over shading by a
proposed structure will present strong cases for injuctive relief.158
On the one hand, plaintiff will be threatened with significant eco-
nomic harm and possibly property damage as a result of interfer-
ence with a use which will have great social value and will be
suitable to the locality. On the other hand, defendant's interest in
residential land development will have comparatively less social
value, and although his conduct also will be suitable to the local-
ity, he probably will be able to avoid the shading without undue
expense or hardship.'59 When shading is actual rather than
threatened, damages should be awarded. 160
("balancing of equities"), (6) the interests of third parties and the public, and (7) the practi-
cability of framing and enforcing the order or judgement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 936(1) (1979); see id. §§ 937-951 (elaborating on these factors). In most solar
access disputes, only the relative adequacy of noninjunctive relief will be left unresolved by
the reasonableness analysis. Recent Development, Casting a Shadow, supra note 11, at 964
n.134. This factor can only help plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, given the inade-
quacy of a damage award to protect his interests. See infra text accompanying note 157.
Damages may be awarded under the Restatement in two situations even if the utility of
defendant's conduct is found to outweigh the gravity of the harm. First, damages may be
awarded when "the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of
compensating for this and similar harms would not make the continuation of the conduct
not feasible." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (1979). Second, a damage
award is proper when "the harm resulting from the invasion is severe and greater than the
other should be required to bear without compensation." Id. § 829A.
156. See, eg., S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 138 (1978); Becker, supra note 11, at 30.
157. Becker, supra note 11, at 30.
158. This fact pattern probably represents the typical solar access dispute. Cf. Recent
Development, Casting a Shadow,supra note 11, at 962-63 n.127 (Prah illustrates what may
be a typical solar access case-conflict between similarly situated "reasonable suburban-
ites"). In such cases, the diligent solar user will have conducted an inquiry to determine the
likelihood of shading by the proposed structure during its planning stages, as did plaintiff
in Prah. Thus, when a potential problem is discovered, assuming that negotiations are not
fruitful, suit could be filed before construction is commenced or at an early stage in the
process.
159. It should be relatively easy and inexpensive for defendant to alter his construction
plans to eliminate the potential for shading. In this situation, the Restatement would de-
clare defendant's conduct unreasonable so long as the threatened harm would be signifi-
cant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 830 (1979).
160. This is possible in two situations. The first is when the solar user fails to discover
the shading problem until it acutally materializes. Injunctive relief will typically be inap-
propriate in this situation because of the potential hardship to defendant, who could be
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Suits to enjoin construction of highrise office or apartment
buildings in highly developed or urban areas will likely be unsuc-
cessful. 16  Plaintiff will be threatened with substantial harm, but
his use, albeit valuable, will not be suitable to the locality and he
will have been able to avoid the problem by not siting his solar
system in an area where shading is inevitable. Defendant, in con-
trast, will have a purpose of at least equal social value, his use will
be suitable to the locality, and it will be impracticable for him to
avoid the shading. A court should award damages in this situa-
tion once the structure is built and shading results. 162
D. Disadvantages of A Nuisance Action
Ultimately, while most problems in applying a nuisance analy-
sis to solar access conflicts are surmountable, a number of general
deficiencies remain. One undesirable consequence of allowing a
nuisance action for solar obstruction is the spawning of litigation
between neighbors. 163  This may discourage peaceful compro-
mise 64 and, as Prah poignantly illustrates, may sharply divide the
litigants' families and erode neighborhood harmony. 165 Litigation
is also costly and timeconsuming both to the parties and the court
forced to alter drastically or demolish his home. Instead, defendant's conduct would be
deemed unreasonable and damages awarded so long as the harm is significant and the
financial burden on defendant would not be unreasonable. See id. § 826(b) & comment f.
The second scenario is when the solar user has knowingly sited his solar system in the
shade of a preexisting structure. A damage remedy in this case would require considera-
tion of the doctrine of "coming to the nuisance." Although application of the doctrine is
not a complete bar to recovery, it is an additional factor courts will have to consider in
determining whether the solar obstruction is an actionable nuisance. See id. § 840D. In
each of the foregoing situations, courts must also evaluate and factor into the damage
equation the importance of ensuring that loss of solar investment does not go uncompen-
sated and that potential investment is not deterred.
161. A number of recent solar access disputes illustrate this sort of conflict. See Siu v.
McCully-Citron Co., No. 56405 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1979) (proposed nine-story moderate in-
come apartment building which would shade residence's solar collectors) (reported in Solar
Access Right Denied By Hawaii Court, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 542 (1979)); Solar Access Leads to
Stamford Dispute, 3 SOLAR L. RaP. 745-46 (1982) (proposed highrise apartment complex
in Stamford, Conn. which would shade residence's active and passive solar collection
areas).
162. This case and other possible permutations involving actual shading in highly de-
veloped or urban areas will be governed by the same considerations applicable to similar
cases in residential areas. See supra note 160. A damage award is more likely in the for-
mer category of cases since the defendant's financial resources will probably be substantial
and thus no unreasonable financial burden would be imposed.
163. S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 138 (1978).
164. See Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 246 n.2, 321 N.W.2d at 193 n.2 (Callow, J., dissenting).
165. See supra note 43.
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system.1 66 The prospect of acquiring access to sunlight only
through an expensive, protracted court action may chill solar in-
vestment. This problem will only be exacerbated by the complex-
ity and uncertainty inherent in nuisance law.' 67 Finally, nuisance
law is only capable of protecting solar access for sited solar sys-
tems, not potential sites.' 68
These disadvantages indicate that a nuisance approach to solar
access is not a panacea. However, because nuisance law is flexible
and solar access legislation cannot possibly solve every dispute, a
nuisance approach has considerable appeal. This Note therefore
proposes an integrated scheme utilizing both nuisance law and
widely accepted legislative approaches.
III. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO SOLAR AcCESS:
EASEMENTS, NUISANCE, AND LAND USE CONTROLS
A private nuisance action, combined with a solar access ease-
ment statute and land use planning legislation, is the ideal ap-
proach to solar access. In formulating this approach, protecting
access for sited solar sytems is distinguished from protecting ac-
cess for potential sites.' 69
A. Sited Solar Systems: Solar Easements and Private Nuisance
1. Solar Easements
Although the common law has consistently honored express
easements to sunlight, 170 twenty-six states have enacted solar ac-
cess easement statutes.' 7 1 This legislation can inform the public of
166. The Prah litigation, for example, began in 1979 and was not concluded until the
settlement in January, 1984. Id One can only imagine the cost to the parties and the
Wisconsin judicial system.
167. G. HAYES, supra note 11, at 174. "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle
in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance."' W. PROSSER, supra note
120, at 571.
168. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 30.
169. This distinction is fully articulated in only two solar access articles. See Eisen-
stadt, supra note 11, at 23; Goble, Siting#Protection: .4 Note on Solar Access, 2 SOLAR L.
REP. 25, 26 (1980).
170. See supra note 18.
171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 801.5 (West 1982); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-32.5-100.3 to -103
(1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1411 to -1414
(Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 55-615 (1979);- ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 7303(e)-(f)
(Smith-Hurd 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-2.5-1 to -3 (West Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 564A.7 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3801 to -3802 (Supp. 1982);
ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1401-1402 (Supp. 1983); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 2-118 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.30 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.012
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the availability of solar easements and encourage their use, notify
landowners that private agreements are binding, and reduce the
complexity of drafting and simplify the implementation of solar
easements. 172
The Colorado statute173 typifies state solar access easement
legislation. The statute initially provides that solar easements
must be in writing and are subject to the same conveyancing and
recording requirements as other easements.' 74 It goes on to re-
quire that the instrument creating the easement describe:
[T]he vertical and horizontal angles, expressed in degrees, to-
gether with any pertinent. . . variations thereof, and measured
from the site of the solar energy device, within which the solar
easement extends over the real property subject to the solar
easement, or. . . the three-dimensional space or the place and
time of day in which an obstruction to direct sunlight is prohib-
ited or limited.' 75
The instrument also must delineate the terms and conditions
under which the easement may be granted or terminated. 76 Fur-
ther, the parties must provide for compensation of the solar user
in the event of shading, and of the owner of the burdened prop-
erty for maintaining the easement.' 77 Finally, the instrument cre-
ating the easement must describe any restrictions on vegetation or
structures which would potentially obstruct the passage of sun-
(Vernon 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-17-301 to -302 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 66-909 to -912 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.370-.380 (1979); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 335-b (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-05-01.1 to -01.2 (1978); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.63 (Page 1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.885-.895 (1981); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 34-40-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-9-201 to -206 (1982 & Supp.
1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-13-1 to -2 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 55-352 to -354
(1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 64.04.140-.170 (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.35
(West Supp. 1983).
172. G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 198.
173. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-32.5-100.3 to -103 (1982). Colorado was the first state to
pass a solar easement statute. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 24 n.19.
174. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-32.5-101 (1982).
175. Id. § 38-32.5-102(a). While many statutes conform to the Colorado model, some
limit the permissible description to the vertical and horizontal angles that define the ease-
ment. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-2.5-3(1) (West. Supp. 1983); N.Y. REAL. PROP.
LAW § 335-b(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-354(1) (1981). Others
only require a description of the three-dimensional space protected by the easement. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 7303(e)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1979); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 11 1.370(4)(c) (1979). For excellent discussions of methods of describing the space in a
solar access easement, see Knowles, The Solar Envelope, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 263 (1980);
Riordan & Hiller, Describing the Solar Space in a Solar Easement, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 299
(1980).
176. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-32.5-102(b) (1982).
177. Id § 38-32.5-102(c).
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light through the easement. 7 8 Injunctive relief is available to en-
force solar easements as well as "other legal remedies." '79
The primary advantage of an express easement approach to
solar access is that it involves a simple transaction between private
parties. 180 A significant disadvantage is that the transaction is vol-
untary-nothing prevents a landowner from refusing to negotiate
or grant a solar easement. 181 Moreover, even a cooperative land-
owner may charge the solar user an exhorbitant price for the ease-
ment. "'82 Finally, solar access easements are only capable of
protecting access for sited solar systems.'83
2. Protecting Accessfor Sited Solar Systems
A solar easement statute coupled with a private nuisance ac-
tion is an ideal means of ensuring solar access for sited solar sys-
tems. Under this approach, a solar user would first negotiate with
adjoining landowners who eventually might interfere with his ac-
cess to sunlight.184 A private nuisance action will serve as a pow-
178. Id § 38-32.5-102(d).
179. Id § 38-32.5-103. Some statutes, while requiring a provision for compensation of
the solar user when sunlight is obstructed, fail to mention injunctive relief. See, e.g., N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 335-b (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 47-05-01.1 to
-01.2 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-9-201 to -206 (1982 & Supp. 1983). Other statutes
completely fail to address the question of remedies. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 32-5-2.5-1 to -3 (West Supp. 1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1401-1402 (Supp.
1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-301 to -302 (1983).
Washington's easement statute has unique provisions governing remedies for solar
blockage. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.04.170 (Supp. 1983). In an action for interfer-
ence with a solar easement, assuming that the instrument is silent regarding the appropriate
remedies, courts may choose among a number of remedies. Actual damages, "measured by
increased charges for supplemental energy, the capital cost of the solar energy system,
and/or the cost of additional equipment necessary to supply sufficient energy," may be
awarded. Id. § 64.04.170(1). Such damages are to be measured from the time the interfer-
ence began until the actual or expected date of its cessation. Id. § 64.04.170(l)(a). A lump
sum representing "the present value of the damages from the time the interference began
until the normally expected end of the useful life of the equipment" may be awarded if the
interference is not expected to cease. Id. § 64.04.170(l)(b). ,A court may also award "rea-
sonable and necesary attorney's fees" and an injunction if it so chooses. Id. § 64.04.170(2)-
(3).
180. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 25. Solar easements "involve no public expenditures,
red tape, or permission." G. IAYEs, supra note 10, at 197.
181. G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 197; Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 25.
182. See G. HAYS, supra note 10, at 197; Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 25. Solar ease-
ments also may entail undesirable tax consequences. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 25; see
Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972) (landowner real-
ized increase in property tax base equal to value of easement of light and air).
183. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 25.
184. One commentator has argued that "[a]lthough it may be easier to negotiate ease-
ments before conflicts arise, few collector owners might do so." G. HAYES, supra note 10,
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erful bargaining toolt s 5-the threat of a lawsuit should encourage
good faith negotiations concerning solar easements and increase
the likelihood of a peaceful, low-cost resolution.18 6 As a last re-
sort, if an easement cannot be obtained and solar obstruction ap-
pears imminent or actually occurs, the solar user would file a
nuisance suit.18 7
The suggested approach to protecting access for sited collec-
tors will be simple to implement since many states currently have
solar easement statutes.188 All that is needed is for courts to fol-
low the lead of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and recognize a nui-
sance action for solar obstruction when given the opportunity.
The combination of an easement statute and a nuisance action
also will provide a level of certainty of access protection sufficient
to prevent the chilling of solar investment.8 9 Solar easements, if
properly drafted and supported by adequate statutory remedies, 19 0
are capable of ensuring maximal solar access protection. Nui-
sance law, although offering less certainty, 9' has the virtue of
flexibility.
at 197. This problem will likely become less significant, however, as current and potential
solar users grow aware of the solar access imperative and the availability of solar
easements.
185. Cf. Comment, Power ofthe Sun, supra note II, at 1289 ("Perhaps the threat of
legal action will even the imbalance in bargaining power between the solar access seeker
and the potential obstructor.").
186. The availability of a nuisance action should act as a moderating influence on the
price of solar easements. In addition, voluntary compromise should help avoid harm to
neighborly relations and the high costs associated with nuisance litigation. See supra notes
163-66 and accompanying text.
187. Professor Ellickson has stressed the need for nuisance law as a supplement to con-
sensual means of dispute resolution: "[T]he wish of landowners to show good manners to
their neighbors, essentially a consensual system, operates to limit the incidence of nui-
sances. Although these voluntary mechanisms should be strengthened, more coercive de-
vices to discourage unneighborly behavior are also needed." Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv.
681, 779-80 (1973).
188. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
189. State land use enabling legislation is not chosen as the means of protecting access
for sited systems precisely because of its lack of certainty. Since such legislation authorizes
but does not require solar access protection, there is a distinct possibility that localities will
fail to act. See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text. In addition, the land use control
methods currently authorized-zoning and subdivision regulations-will provide uncertain
access protection even if adopted by local governments. See infra notes 210-11 & 217 and
accompanying text.
190. The comprehensive list of remedies in the Washington easement statute would be
ideal. See supra note 179.
191. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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B. Potential Solar System Sites: Land Use Controls
Land use planning, traditionally a function of local govern-
ment, refers to "the physical development of the community ac-
cording to a master plan based on careful and comprehensive
surveys and studies of present conditions and future expecta-
tions."' 192 Local governments acquire the power to regulate land
use from the state, where the police power ultimately resides,
through the state constitution, a home rule grant, or, more typi-
cally, an enabling act. 19 3 State enabling acts commonly require
that local land use regulations be in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan. 194 The acts usually set forth the purposes of land
use planning and the various tools available to implement the
comprehensive plan.' 95 Common land use controls include zon-
ing ordinances, subdivision regulations, and building and con-
struction codes. 196
Delegating responsibility for protecting solar access to the lo-
cal level entails both advantages and disadvantages. An advan-
tage is that local governments have traditionally regulated land
use, and thus have administration and enforcement mechanisms
in place.'97 Local governments also have superior knowledge of
important considerations such as prevailing land use patterns, the
needs of the community, topography, and the height and bulk of
buildings. 198 Moreover, local officials are directly accountable to
the people who will be affected by solar access regulations and
will best be able to strike a proper balance between access protec-
tion and land development.' 99 The overriding disadvantage of lo-
cal control is that since existing state legislation authorizes but
does not require solar access protection, economic and political
influences may persuade local governments not to act. 200 Even if
192. S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 73 (1978).
193. Id. at 75 (citing W. THOMAS, A. MILLER & R. ROBBINS, OVERCOMING LEGAL
BARRIERS TO THE USE OF SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS 83 (1977)).
194. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER
§ 18.05 (1974).
195. Id. §§ 18.04, 18.07.
196. R. YEARWOOD, LAND SUBDIVISION REGULATION 15 (1971).
197. G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 217.
198. Id. at 218; Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 39-40.
199. G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 218.
200. Local governments often exhibit a strong bias in favor of land development and
the tax revenues that it produces. Id. Further, because planners are accountable to the
community at large, they might be easily discouraged from protecting solar access by pres-
sures from individuals and developers. "It's the political climate, not the weather, that will
govern the future of solar energy." ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 1, at 212.
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inclined to act, local governments may lack the necessary funding
and expertise to implement solar access controls. 20'
1. Current Solar Land Use Controls
Arizona 20 2 and Minnesota 20 3 require local governments to in-
clude a solar access element in their comprehensive plans, while
some states make such action permissive. 2°  A number of states
enable localities to protect solar access by land use control meth-
ods. The two most common methods authorized are zoning and
subdivision regulation.
a. Solar Zoning. Twelve states expressly authorize local gov-
ernments to zone for solar access.20 5 Solar access zoning typically
would involve establishing an airspace over a landowner's prop-
erty that he could not occupy. 2°6 Commentators have proposed
various methods of defining the airspace.20 7
The principal advantage of solar access zoning is flex-
ibility-zoning ordinances are easily altered and may be tailored
to meet the needs of communities with divergent land use pat-
terns.20 8 Solar access zoning would also spread the burden of ac-
cess protection over an entire community, rather than placing it
201. G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 218. Federal and/or state assistance could alleviate
this concern. Id.
202. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-461.05(C)(1) (Supp. 1983).
203. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.39(3) (West Supp. 1984) (regional development commis-
sions); id. § 473.859(2) (local govermental units in metropolitan areas). But see id
§ 473.05(1) (plans of planning commissions for metropolitan areas may contain solar access
element).
204. NEB. REv. STAT. § 66-913 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-4 (Supp. 1983);
WASH. REv. CODE § 35.63.090 (Supp. 1983).
205. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-462.01(A)(3) (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 31-23-301 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2 (West Supp. 1983); Ma. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4961(1) (Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.25(2), 462.357(1)
(West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-913 (1981); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(24) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1983); N.Y. TowN LAW § 263 (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7- 704 (McKinney Supp. 1983); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 215.044, 227.190 (1981); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 13-7-101, -210 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-11 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 4407(13) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 35.63.080 (Supp. 1983).
Solar zoning is probably permissible, even absent express authority, under the standard
"adequate light and air" provisions of state zoning enabling acts. Eisenstadt, supra note 11,
at 40.
206. S. KRAEMER, supra note 2, at 79 (1978).
207. See, e.g., id. at 112-16 (solar access overlay zoning); Osofsky, Solar Building Enve-
lopes.- A Zoning Approachfor Protecting Residential Solar Access, 15 URB. LAW. 637 (1983)
(solar envelope zoning).
208. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 47.
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on the individual solar user.20 9 The primary drawback of solar
zoning is the uncertainty stemming from the ease by which zoning
ordinances are changed and the abuse of variance procedures. 210
The existence of nonconforming uses also may present problems
in developed areas.211
b. Solar Subdivision Regulation. "Subdivision regulation is
the control by a public authority of the platting and conversion of
raw land into building lots. '21 2 Municipalities typically require
real estate developers to meet certain standards and requirements
in exchange for permission to record the plat and sell the lots. 21 3
Seven states currently authorize local governments to protect solar
access through subdivision regulation.2 14
Subdivision regulation as a means of ensuring solar access
would be simple to implement and its cost would be absorbed by
the purchasers of lots in a subdivision, rather than the local gov-
ernment.2 15 Subdivision regulation would also promote uniform
access protection and thus would facilitate administration.21 6
Like solar zoning, the major problem with solar subdivision regu-
lation is uncertainty. Once a subdivision has been completed and
209. Id. at 47-48. The individual solar user also would not experience any cost or
delay due to access problems when he first installs his system. Id. at 47.
210. Id. at 48. Solar investment may be deterred by such uncertain protection. See G.
HAYES, supra note 10, at 75. Several states have addressed the concern that existing zoning
ordinances could prevent or restrict installation of solar systems. They have provided that
a potential solar user may obtain a variance if a zoning ordinance prevents the installation
of his solar system or causes him undue hardship. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.27(7),
462.357(6) (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REv. STAT. § 66-914 (1981).
211. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 48. This will only be a problem, however, until the
use expires. Id.
212. R. YEARwooD, supra note 196, at 20.
213. Id.
214. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66475.3 (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-25(b)
(West Supp. 1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4956(3-A) (Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 462.358(2)(a) (West Supp. 1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 92.044(l)(a)(C) (1981); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-27-11.5 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4407(13) (Supp. 1983).
Local governments may, for example, require that subdivision plans contain restrictive
covenants, height restrictions, side yard and setback requirements, and "other forms of
land use controls" to protect solar access. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4956(3-A) (Supp.
1983). Some state statutes authorize localities to disapprove a subdivision plan that con-
tains, or declare void and unenforceable, covenants, restrictions, or conditions in deeds or
other instruments affecting the transfer of land which restrict or prohibit installation of a
solar energy system. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168
(1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.04 (West Supp. 1983); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-119
(1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.880 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-11.6 (Supp. 1983).
215. G. HAYEs, supra note 10, at 129.
216. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 29.
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sold, the regulations no longer apply and landowners are free to
obstruct solar access.21 7 In addition, the application of subdivision
regulation is, as a practical matter, limited to undeveloped
areas.
218
2. Protecting Access for Potential Solar System Sites
Land use controls are the most desirable method of protecting
solar access for potential solar system locations. Based on the
unique needs and desires of the community, local governments
can choose whether or not to plan for solar access. A combination
of solar zoning and subdivision regulation should be adopted. Be-
cause these methods have already received considerable accept-
ance in state legislatures, the proposed approach would be
relatively simple to implement in many states. Solar zoning
should be used to plan for access protection in developed areas
and subdivision regulation should be used in undeveloped areas.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the common law currently fails to safeguard ade-
quately a landowner's interest in access to sunlight, the ability of
the common law to change with the needs of society is one of its
strongest attributes. As the Prah court recognized, expanding in-
vestment in solar energy and the correlative problem of protecting
solar access mandate a change in the common law of nuisance.
While state legislatures also have addressed the solar access issue,.
legislative action cannot and must not serve as an excuse for judi-
cial inaction. No single approach is a cure-all-a comprehensive
strategy that combines nuisance law, a solar easement statute, and
land use controls is the most effective and realistic approach to the
solar access conundrum.
SHAWN M. LYDEN
217. G. HAYES, supra note 10, at 129. This problem could be eliminated if restrictive
covenants are a component of the subdivision regulations. See id.
218. See id.
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